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Abstract
We construct an overlapping−generations experiment to test for two alleged departures from
Ricardian equivalence. In the first treatment the setting is close to the theoretical model,
while in the second we allow for liquidity−constrained consumers. We then introduce
uncertainty on future income for the first generation. Ricardian equivalence is well supported
in the baseline experiment and to some extent in the liquidity−constraint case, whereas it is
clearly rejected under uncertainty.
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1. Introduction 
Experimental economics has gained a considerable attention and has been effective in 
shedding some light on several microeconomic fields (e.g., decision theory under risk and 
uncertainty, public goods, industrial organization). Much less interest has been obtained by 
macroeconomics. Large-scale macroeconomic experiments are unfeasible because of 
political and financial considerations. However, modern macroeconomic theory is strongly 
based on microeconomic assumptions. Therefore, controlled laboratory experiments can be 
used to test both the aggregate and individual predictions of micro-founded models. 
Ricardian equivalence is not an exception. It is based on a rational representative agent 
who maximizes an intertemporal utility function in which the utility of their descendants is 
an argument, subject to a resource constraint.  
Empirical research on this topic is usually carried out by estimating some aggregate 
consumption functions. While a considerable body of econometric evidence fails to 
support debt neutrality, many authors maintain that the data demonstrates that Ricardian 
equivalence holds in a mild version, their argument being that the econometric 
specification of the tests is incorrect and biased against Ricardian equivalence. The two 
most important surveys of this topic (Bernheim, 1987; Seater, 1993) conclude with 
conflicting findings, the former being against and the latter in favor. We believe that the 
use of the experimental method may add some more evidence to this debate. Ricardian 
equivalence has already been the topic of one experiment (Cadsby and Frank, 1991; CF 
thereafter).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the role played by liquidity 
constraints and income uncertainty in causing departures from Ricardian equivalence. In 
Section 3 the experimental setting is described and analyzed with reference to similar 
frameworks. Section 4 discusses the results, and conclusions are drawn in the final Section.  
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Barro (1974) states the irrelevance of the means of financing government expenditure 
through taxes or debt. Sufficient conditions for this result are (i) lump-sum taxes; (ii) 
certainty about future levels of income, public expenditure, rates of return, etc.; (iii) perfect 
capital markets; and (iv) infinite horizons for households. Under these conditions, the 
present value of taxes is fixed by the given path of government expenditure. This result 
applies as long as the government cannot pursue Ponzi schemes in which the public debt 
can grow faster than the economy, indefinitely. In this case, public borrowing can change 
the timing of taxes but not the present value. Therefore, the issue of an extra dollar of debt 
to cut current taxes by one dollar implies an increase by one dollar in the present value of 
future taxes.  
With lump-sum taxes, infinite horizons, and perfect capital markets, the 
representative household cares only about the present value of taxes. The timing of these 
levies does not matter. Since a deficit-financed tax cut does not alter this present value, the 
tax cut does not affect consumer demand. It follows that the extra government bonds 
issued to finance the tax cut are willingly held by households without any changes in 
market interest rates. That is, the additional dollar of public dissaving is met by an added 
dollar of private saving, so that national saving does not change. The Ricardian proposition 
still holds with some modifications of the basic conditions. For example, the irrelevance 
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proposition is valid if households have finite lives, as long as each household is connected 
to future generations by a network of active intergenerational transfers based on altruism.  
All these conditions have been argued against because of their lack of realism. We 
are now going to concentrate on the theoretical arguments against Ricardian equivalence 
based on the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers and on uncertainty about future 
income. They are preliminary to the experimental analysis we have conducted. According 
to the literature, one of the most acknowledged departures from Ricardian equivalence is 
the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers (Heller and Starr, 1979; Hubbard and 
Judd, 1986). Under the assumption that 20 percent of the population is liquidity 
constrained a $1 deficit-for-taxes swap could increase current consumption by about 25 
cents, a far larger result than the one associated with the only wealth effect (5 cents). If 
there are inefficiencies in the credit market, some consumers are unable to borrow or can 
borrow at an interest rate higher than the lending one. Consumers will spend some of the 
money arising from a tax cut because the government gives them terms of exchange 
between current and future consumption which makes them better off than the market 
interest rate. If there is a tax cut, these agents can increase their current consumption 
(constrained by their inability to borrow against the future income) and pay more taxes in 
the future. The government allows them to do what the credit market does not permit, and 
in this way they can increase their utility smoothing consumption all over their lifetime.  
Uncertainty on future income is another reason for the failure for Ricardian 
equivalence. According to Feldstein (1988), even in an economy in which altruism is the 
only bequest motive, taxes are lump-sum and there is no uncertainty on the date of an 
individual’s death, if second-period earnings are uncertain, bequests also are uncertain at 
the time of first-period consumption. If the individual knew with certainty that he was not 
going to make a bequest, the extra tax borne by the next generation would be irrelevant to 
him, and he could divide his tax cut between his own consumption in the first and second 
period. The individual raises his first-period consumption knowing that with probability 1 - 
p he will not want to make a bequest and will raise his second-period consumption by the 
remainder. With probability p the individual will have high income in the second period, 
will therefore choose to make a bequest, and will use some of his additional first-period 
saving to make a larger bequest than he would otherwise have made. Therefore, 
consumption rises more in response to an increase in current disposable income than to an 
equal present value increase in the disposable income of the next generation.1  
 
 
3. Experimental design 
We build our experimental design on CF by imposing in the utility function of parents the 
utility level attained to their descendants. The parents’ utility function is: 
 
UP = CP1* CP2 * UD,         (1) 
                                                 
1 Strawczynki (1995) obtains a generalization of this result in an infinite horizon model. He shows that 
because of income uncertainty and precautionary savings, Ricardian equivalence may fail. Government 
transfers in the “second period uncertainty income case” allow for a substantial reduction in precautionary 
savings and boost consumption, while in the “future generation income uncertainty case” precautionary 
savings are only partially affected. In addition, it is useful to point out that the extent of the failure does not 
depend on the degree of income uncertainty. See also Chan (1983) and Barsky et al. (1986) for reasoning on 
ex ante uncertainty and riskiness of future income. 
 3
  
where: CP1 and CP2 are parents’ consumption in period 1 and 2, respectively and UD is the 
utility obtained by its descendant, which in turns is: 
 
UD = CD2 * CD3,          (2) 
 
where: CD2 and CD3 are offspring consumption in period 2 and 3. Our goal is to test 
whether some alleged departures for Ricardian equivalence are able to significantly change 
the size of the bequests left to following generations. Therefore we have designed three 
different experiments. The first one resembles quite closely a Ricardian environment. The 
second and the third ones depart from that ideal setting, allowing for liquidity-constrained 
agents and for uncertainty on future income.  
In the CF experiment subjects are given a certain role for the whole duration of the 
game. Their procedure may be vulnerable to “backward induction” (van der Heijden et al., 
1998), and therefore testing for Ricardian equivalence would become the same as testing 
for the ability of subjects to perform this game theory solution concept. Any result 
achieved in this way may be misleading. To overcome this problem we have taken some of 
the features of the methodology used by Marimon and Sunder (1993). We have recruited 
seventeen subjects. The computer randomly selected ten of them, five of which played as 
parents in the first period. The other five enter into the game in period two, while they play 
alone in period three. Therefore the game has to start again: five of the seven people that 
have not played in the first stage are selected to play along with and five of the ten that 
have already played. The roles of these ten people are randomly selected. It may happen 
that a person would stay outside the game for more than one period, as well as it is possible 
to participate in the same role for more than one period. Randomness in the participation to 
the games should ensure that the planning horizon of the players would not extend to the 
whole set of games.2  
In the baseline treatment subjects selected to act in period 1 as parents receive a 
certain disposable income plus an extra income - which represent the tax cut in the 
Ricardian story. They are informed about their disposable income, an extra amount of 
money available in period 2 (disposable income in periods 1 is equal to disposable income 
in period 2, and the same holds for extra amounts), and the income of their descendants. 
Money is expressed in artificial experimental units. Therefore, they decide how much to 
spend and to save in the first period and, when resources become available, in the second 
period. For simplicity there is no interest rate. They are also informed at the beginning that 
the extra resources they use are subtracted from their descendants, and the amount of 
money they save in the second period is given to their descendants. Offspring start playing 
in period 2 when they get informed about their personal available income in periods 2 and 
3, and the amount of extra resources their parents have received. At the and of period 2 
parents die, and in period 3 only descendants remain in the game. They receive the 
                                                 
2 The Ricardian equivalence model aussumes an infinite horizon, which in experimental economics is usually 
obtained randomly choosing the termination of the game. CF do not follow this procedure and fix the number 
of repetitions. This violates the infinite horizon hypothesis. However, we have used this aspect of their design 
to avoid a too many changes in the experimental procedure. In case of rejection of the Ricardian hypothesis 
in a baseline experiment in which two aspects of the design had been changed, we would be unable to discern 
whether this happened because of the first change or because of the second, or both. This would have 
reduced comparability with CF results. 
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disposable income and the bequest, if any, left to them by their parents, and the extra 
resources parents have received are subtracted. Then descendants die and the game starts 
again according to the rules described above. All the decisions are subject to a positive 
binding.3  
In the liquidity-constraint treatment agents acting as parents are informed in the 
first period about the personal disposable income available in periods 1 and 2, noticing that 
the latter is greater than the former, the extra amounts available in both periods are equal, 
and heirs’ income. In the income-uncertainty treatment, in the first period, parents are 
informed of their current disposable income, of the extra amounts available in periods 1 
and 2, which is equal across periods, and their descendants’ income. At the beginning of 
period 2 they are informed about the personal disposable income for that period, which 
may be higher, lower or equal to the one received in the first period. In contrast, nothing 
changes for descendants with respect to the baseline treatment. Across treatments we have 
given parents the same income. 
Typically, in OLG models, agents of each generation are given a certain 
endowment at the beginning of the first period that they have to allocate between the two 
periods in which they live. Because of the departures from Ricardian equivalence we wish 
to study, and for comparability between different treatments, we find this way unfeasible. 
Giving all the income at the beginning would have made it impossible to model 
imperfections in the second period, liquidity constraints as well as income uncertainty. CF 
gave extra income only in the second period. However, to give to liquidity-constrained 
consumers the possibility to smooth consumption via the tax cut, we have to provide them 
with additional resources also in the first period. 
We report the results from a series of experiments that were undertaken at the 
University of Siena using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Subjects 
were first- and second-year undergraduate students in economics with no prior knowledge 
of Ricardian equivalence. Each experiment composed of 40 games in which two 
generations participate. Every 10 games the relative magnitude of the parameters changed, 
that is we have modified the income of each generation and the size of the extra money 
received, constructing different environments. We call these groups sets. In particular, in 
the first set there are poor parents, poor descendants and low debt; in the second there are 
rich parents, medium-income descendants and low debt; in the third there are rich parents, 
rich descendants and medium debt, and finally there are rich parents, rich descendants, and 
low debt. This has been done to isolate possible wealth-effects. Subjects were informed of 
the parameters’ switching. Before running the experiment, a quiz was administrated to 
check the comprehension of the instructions. Five periods of training were allowed before 
each session. Each experiment lasted about two hours. Subjects received a show-up fee of 
€ 5, and the average gain from the experiment was € 19.3.            
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Instructions are available upon request. 
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4. Analysis of the results 
The optimal solution of the consumption problem at hand is to equate consumption in the 
two periods and for parents to bequeath a sum equal to the extra income received. The 
hypotheses we test are the following:4 
 
 HYPOTHESIS 1: In the baseline treatment, consumption in the first and in the second 
periods are equal, while in the two other treatments equality does not hold. 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 2: In the baseline treatment, parents bequeath an amount equal to the 
extra income they received; in the other two treatments the bequest is lower than the tax 
cut. Alternatively we can say that net bequest is equal to zero in the baseline and negative 
in the credit-constraint and uncertainty treatments. 
 
 In this Section we provide evidence on both consumption smoothing and the size of 
bequests in all treatments.  
 
4.1. Consumption smoothing 
In the baseline the equality of consumption in the two periods is obtained on average in 
26% of the cases, with values ranging from 16% to 32% among sets. First-period 
consumption is lower than that of the second-period for 54.5% of the sample. There is a 
clear difference between the first set and all other sets: 32% compared to values ranging 
between 56% and 66%.  
In the liquidity-constraint treatment equality in consumption is recorded in 8.5% of 
cases. This percentage is fairly constant among the first three sets, climbing to 27% in the 
last. Due to the increasing profile of parents’ interperiodal disposable income, many 
subjects (79%) show a tendency to consume more in the second period than in the first, 
and there is no significant variation among the sets. Subjects in the “uncertainty treatment” 
consume the same amount in all periods in 9.5% of cases, with the exception of set 1 
(16%), and the frequency is similar among the other three sets. Similarly to the baseline, 
113 subjects (56.5%) chose to consume less in period 1 than in period 2. These subjects are 
almost equally distributed among sets.  
These frequencies are poor by themselves in representing the effective consumers’ 
behavior. A better understanding may be inferred by comparing other aggregate statistics. 
Subjects in the first treatment exhibit a strong tendency to smooth their consumption. On 
average, the difference between their own first and second consumption level is -6.2 units, 
with a standard deviation of 18.7, and a median value of -2. This attitude is also reflected 
by the relatively close distribution of individual choices: the interval [-6; 7] includes 140 
(out of 200) cases of individual consumption differences; 162 in the range [-10; 10].  
Average interperiodal consumption difference is -20.4 in the “liquidity-constraint 
treatment” (std. dev. 27.77); the median value is -12. Only 81 cases are in the range of [-
10; 10], which is precisely half the number of that in the baseline. In the “uncertainty 
treatment” the average difference is -6. This mean value is close to that calculated for the 
baseline. The same holds for the median (-3). However, the similarities between the two 
treatments stop here: just in the interval [-20; 18] we can observe 140 observations.  
                                                 
4 The analytical solution is available upon request. 
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Summing up, the structure of the utility function in the overall experiment creates 
an incentive to equate interperiodal consumption. Agents’ performance in reaching this 
objective depends crucially on the complexity of the context. Consumption smoothing is 
more likely to occur in the baseline than in the other treatments. Upon interpreting these 
data we argue that, when agents face situations more complex than an ideal setting they 
fail, on average, to reach a satisfying level of consumption smoothing. The failure has a 
double face. There is a higher number of failing agents relative to the entire sample, and 
the magnitude of the dispersion of their choices is greater. 
More formal tests confirm these pictures (Table 2). We perform a series of 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) under the null hypothesis that on 
average consumption in the first period is equal to consumption in the second period. The 
alternative hypothesis is two-tail, since we do not have an explicit expectation on this 
hypothesis. Results show that we the cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
significance level for the baseline, while we can reject the null in the liquidity-constraint 
treatment at the 1% significance level and at the 5% in the uncertainty treatment.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Bequest size and motive 
We can now analyze subjects’ choices concerning the second relevant decisional variable, 
the net bequest (the difference between the bequest left to the offspring and the tax cut 
whose burden falls on the second generation). In the ideal setting, the baseline treatment, 
by aggregating agents’ choices we obtain a mean of 2.6 units (std. dev. 18.6) end a zero 
median value. A little bit more than half the observations belong to the interval [-5; 11]. 
The summary statistics on net bequest as a percentage of the total amount of debt issued, 
shows to be good news for Ricardian equivalence. On average, subjects leave 6.5% more 
than the sum strictly necessary. More than half of the cases (103), bequeaths an amount 
between -15 and 15%. Less than 5% of the observations choose values that pay just half of 
the tax burden or less.  
When facing liquidity-constraints, aggregate behavior does not support the 
conclusion in favor of a Ricardian bequest motive with the same strength as before. Even 
exhibiting a zero median value and a mean of -2.1 units, observations are more widely 
distributed. The amplitude of the range, which includes half of the observations, is much 
bigger than in the previous case [-19; 11]. Note this expansion is totally charged to the 
negative direction of the horizontal axis, the upper limit of the interval being unchanged, 
reflecting the augmented weight of negative net bequest choices. In addition, 20% of 
subjects leave resources covering half of the tax burden or less. Results from the 
“uncertainty treatment” are even worse: the median value for net bequest is -13 units and -
29% of the debt to be repaid. In representing these observations mean values (-6 as in 
absolute terms as in percentage) can generate some illusive effect. They are distorted by 9 
(5% of the total) observations, whose bequest is 3 times the necessary sum or even more. 
Recalculating mean values after having excluded these outliers gives a mean of -11.4 units 
or -20%.  
We have calculated again the Wilcoxon rank-sum test under the null hypothesis 
that the mean of debt is equal to the mean of bequest left to the subsequent generation. 
Table 3 shows that we cannot reject the null for the baseline, whereas non-rejection is 
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borderline in the liquidity-constraint treatment. Under uncertainty we can clearly reject the 
null. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Dealing with an uncertain income profile, agents usually fail to make precautionary 
savings. In the second period subjects face a dilemma if parameters prescribe a diminishing 
income profile. They can either use the amount of debt to smooth consumption or save it 
for the benefit of their future generation. Usually they choose an intermediate solution: part 
of the debt is consumed, the rest is bequeathed. As it has been graphically shown, their 
decisions do not allow us to conclude that they are effective in smoothing their 
consumption.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have presented the results of a series of experiments in which we have tested for 
possible departures from Ricardian equivalence. In doing so we have improved upon 
previous studies dealing with the same topic, in two directions. Firstly, we have considered 
two well-known theoretical causes of the likely failure of Ricardian equivalence. Secondly, 
we have used a matching rule that has been extensively used in monetary economics 
experiments that rules out the possibility of supergame effects. We are able to accept the 
idea that debt neutrality works with some approximations in the baseline, while uncertainty 
on future income makes very likely debt neutrality failure. Under liquidity constraint 
agents do not equate consumption over the two periods and, as a result, they appear (to 
some extent) to leave their offspring with enough wealth. Finally, a word of caution is 
needed, since these results are based on few observations. We plan to overcome this 
limitation, together with the infinite horizon issue, running further experiments.    
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Table 1 – Experimental parameters 
Parents Descendants Treatments 
1st period 
income 
2nd period 
income
Total tax-cut 1st period 
income 
2nd period 
income
Baseline  
1st set 
 
16 16 23 25 25
Baseline  
2nd set 
 
69 69 19 24 24
Baseline  
3rd set 
 
56 56 40 70 70
Baseline  
4th set 
 
21 21 18 47 47
Liquidity 
constraint 
1st set 
10 22 23 25 25
Liquidity 
constraint 
2nd set 
45 93 19 24 24
Liquidity 
constraint 
3rd set 
35 77 40 70 70
Liquidity 
constraint 
4th set 
17 25 18 47 47
Uncertainty 
1st set 
 
17 15 23 25 25
Uncertainty 
2nd set 
 
69 69 19 24 24
Uncertainty 
3rd set 
 
58 54 40 70 70
Uncertainty 
4th set 
 
20 22 18 47 47
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Table 2 – Wilcoxon rank-sum test for parents’ consumption 
Treatments Test statistic p-value
Baseline -1.820 0.069
Liquidity-constraint -6.392 0.000
Uncertainty -2.033 0.042
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Wilcoxon rank-sum test for debt and bequest  
Treatment Test statistic p-value
Baseline -1.254 0.210
Liquidity-constraint 1.687 0.094
Uncertainty 4.518 0.000
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